

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-12 ADP-00 SS-15 AID-20 AGR-20 EA-11 EUR-25

TRSE-00 EB-11 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INR-10 JUSE-00 NSAE-00

RSC-01 SNM-02 SY-10 USIA-12 NSC-10 SCI-06 OMB-01

RSR-01 /180 W

----- 064348

R 150850 Z MAY 73

FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3262

USMISSION GENEVA

INFO USMISSION USUN

BNDD WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 3538

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SNAR, AF, UN

SUBJ: NARCOTICS: UN PROGRAM FOR AFGHANISTAN

REF: A) STATE 82075; B) KABUL 3331; C) KABUL 3395; D) KABUL 3073

SUMMARY: OVERAL, KABUL POLOFF HELSETH'S DISCUSSIONS NEW YORK AND GENEVA WERE NOT ENCOURAGING. MARTENS WAS OUTGOING AND FRANK; BUT PROBABLY NOT FULLY AWARE DETAILS. WHILE HE WAS FIRM THAT FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR AERIAL SURVEY DURING REMAINDER POPPY BLOOMING

SEASON COULD AND WOULD BE OBTAINED, HIS COLLEAGUES IN GENEVA WERE LESS DISPOSED BELIEVE PROJECT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED AND MORE INCLINED THINK IN LONG- RANGE TERMS. NEITHER MARTENS NOR SCHUMRANN EXPRESSED OPPOSITION TO US ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE TO MINJUSTICE UNIT, BUT MANBY AGAIN ARGUED AGAINST IT ON LONG RANGE INSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS. PREPARATION OF " SHOPPING LIST" FOR OTHER DONORS JUST UNDERWAY. SCHURMANN FORESEES FURTHER DELAYS: CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE MEETING GENEVA NOT BEFORE MID- JULY AND SUBSEQUENT MEETING IN KABUL IN OCTOBER. HE SAID PM SHAFIQ HAD APPROVED THIS TIMETABLE. ACTION REQUESTED: SUGGEST GENEVA (1) ATTEMPT RECONCILE CONFLICTING VIEWS ON ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE WHEN

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ALL PARTICIPANTS HAVE RETURNED AND (2) MAINTAIN PRESSURE FOR EARLY COMPLETEION/ DISTRIBUTION SHOPPING LIST. END SUMMARY.

1. REF A REPORTED MOST OF DISCUSSION WHICH BETTY GOUGH AND KABUL POLOFF HELSETH HAD WITH UNFDAC ACTING EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR MARTENS IN NEW YORK MAY 1. IN ADDITION AND IN RESPONSE TO HELSETH QUERY, MARTENS RESPONDED THAT ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE TO BOTH MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND MINISTRY OF JUSTICE UNITS DID NOT POSE PROBLEM FOR HIM (COMMENT: IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT MARTENS MAY NOT HAVE YET BEEN EXPOSED TO MANBY' S STRONG RESERVATIONS ON THIS POINT. THIS SHOULD BE CLARIFIED FOLLOWING HIS AND MISS GOUGH' S RETURN TO GENEVA.)

2. CONVERSATIONS IN GENEVA WITH AMBASSADOR SCHURMANN AND WITH GROUP COMPOSED OF SOTEROFF (MARTENS' DEPUTY), MANBY, NOLL AND ARNESON (SCHURMANN' S DEPUTY). MISOFF LYERLY ACCOMPANIED HELSETH ON BOTH CALLS AND MAY WISH SUPPLEMENT FOLLOWING ACCOUNT.

3. A. CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE: AMBASSADOR SCHURMANN SAID THAT HE HAD ASSURANCES FROM US OF SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT, FROM IRAN OF " IMPORTANT" SUPPORT, FROM JAPAN OF EXPERTS AND EQUIPMENT. RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR IN KABUL HAD TOLD SCHURMANN THAT USSR WOULD CERTAINLY HELP SINCE AFGHANISTAN WAS IMPORTANT TO IT AND USSR HAD EXTENDED CONSIDERABLE HELP ALREADY. SPECIFICALLY, RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR HAD MENTIONED BUILDING ROAD(NOTE: IT NOT CLEAR WHETHER THIS REFERS TO CURRENT RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE IN ROAD CONSTRUCTION OR POSSIBLE EXTENSION AS FAR AS FAIZABAD. AMBASSADOR SCHURMANN WAS NOT CERTAIN ON THIS POINT.) IBRD HAS ALSO INFORMED SCHURMANN OF INTENTION ASSIST. FRG AMBASSADOR SAID HE HAD STILL NOT HEARD FROM BO
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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-12 ADP-00 SS-15 AID-20 CIAE-00 INR-10

JUSE-00 NSAE-00 RSC-01 SNM-02 SY-10 TRSE-00 USIA-12

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3263
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 3538

4. A. ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE: IN FOLLOWING MEETING WITH SOTEROFF, MANBY, NOLL AND ARNESON, MANBY REITERATED HIS OPPOSITION TO ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE TO BOTH MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND MINISTRY OF JUSTICE. HE RECOGNIZED SHORT- TERM BENEFITS WHICH WE HAVE ESPOUSED AND FACT THAT AFGHANS THEMSELVES WISH ASSISTANCE FOR BOTH UNITS BUT HE BELIEVES IT WRONG TO BUILD UP TWO INSITUCTIONS OF ENFORCEMENT WHICH IN LONG RUN MIGHT BECOME RIVALS. WHEN HELSETH BEGAN REPEAT ARGUMENT (WHICH WOULD HAVE INCLUDED POINTS MADE BY AMBASSADOR NEWUMANN AND BNDD- SAIC BURKE IN KABUL - REF D), MANBY INTERRUPTED TO INDICATE HE WAS FULL AWARE THIS POSITION. WHEN HELSETH POINTED OUT APPARENT LACK OF REFERENCE TO GENDARMERIE IN UN/ FAO REPORT, MANBY SAID IT HAD BEEN HIS INTENTION TO INCLUDE GENDARMERIE IN HIS REFERENCE TO BORDER CHECKPOINTS. HE AND NOLL AGREED THIS POINT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR IN REVISION OF REPORT.

B. AERIAL SURVEY; MANBY SAID THAT SCHURMANN' S STATEMENT ON AERIAL SURVEY WAS NOT CORRECT AND THAT AERIAL SURVEY ARRANGEMENTS HAD NOT YET BEEN MADE; NOR DID HE SEE ANY URGENCY IN PROGRAM SINCE WE WERE ALL ENGAGED IN MULTI- YEAR PROGRAM. FURTHER DISCUSSION REVEALED THAT MANBY WAS DISCUSSING AN AERIAL SURVEY IN CONNECTION WITH LAND USE AND RECLAMATION WHICH VARIOUS AGRICULTURAL STUDY TEAMS
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WILL WORK UPON. WHEN HELSETH POINTED OUT THAT US WAS INTERESTED IN AERIAL SURVEY NOW WHILE POPPIES IN BLOOM , MANBY EXPRESSED OPINION IT WAS TOO LATE AND SHOWED NO DISTRESS WHEN HELSETH POINTED OUT FAILURE TO ACCOMPLISH AERIAL SURVEY NOW WOULD MEAN LOSS OF YEAR.

C. DRAFT NARCOTICS LAW: NOLL COMMENTED AS HE HAD EARLIER IN KABUL THAT DRAFT LAW WAS COMPLETELY INADEQUATE. HE AND MANBY BELIEVED IT WAS ROUGH DRAFT HASTILY PUT TOGETHER. NOLL SAID HE HAD UNDERTAKEN WITH AFGHAN CONSENT REVISION OF LAW (WHICH WILL BE ALMOST ENTIRELY REWRITE), BUT THAT HIS VISIT TO KABUL CANNOT BE UNTIL JUNE SINCE HE MUST FIRST VISIT KATHMANDU IN CONNECTION WITH NARCOTIC PROGRAM THERE. HELSETH URGED HIM COMPLETE TASK AND VISIT KABUL ASAP.

D. SHOPPING LIST: ARNESON SAID HE HAD BEGUN DRAFTING SHOPPING LIST BUT COULD NOT ESTIMATE WHEN IT WOULD BE COMPLETED. COMPLETION WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO AWAIT MICUTA' S RETURN TO GENEVA. HELSETH URGED COMPLETION AND DISTRIBUTION OF SHOPPING LIST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN VIEW POSSIBLE FURTHER DELAYS IN PROPOSED TIMETABLE.

E. SOTEROFF TOOK ACTIVE PART IN CONVERSATION; BUT HIS MAIN AIM SEEMED TO BE PREVENT OTHERS FROM COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO ANY SPECIFIC COURSE OF ACTION. HE COMMENTED THAT NOTHING FIRM COULD

BE STATED UNTIL MARTENS AND MICUTA HAD RETURNED FROM NEW YORK
WITH FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATION - ESPECIALLY IF

PROPOSED AGREEMENT WITH AFGHANS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY UN/ NY.

5. COMMENT: A. IT OBVIOUS UN HAD NOT YET SORTED OUT ITS VIEWS ON
NUMBER OF POINTS REGARDING NARCOTICS PROGRAM IN AFGHANISTAN.
PART OF CURRENT CONFUSION APPARENTLY RESULTED FROM ECOSOC
MEETING

AT UN/ NY AND UNCERTAINTY WHETHER REORGANIZATION WOULD BE
APPROVED.

THERE ALSO APPEAR TO BE POSSIBLE PERSONALITY CONFLICTS WHICH
REORGANIZATION MAY RESOLVE FAVORABLY. OF GREAT INTEREST IS
WHETHER EXPERT' S (MANBY' S) VIEW WILL PREVAIL IN LONG RUN OVER
MORE GENERAL VIEWS ON POLICE ASSISTANCE EXPRESSED BY MARTENS
AND SCHURMANN.

B. IT IS AGAIN OBVIOUS TO US THAT NO NARCOTICS PROGRAM WORTHY
OF THE NAME WILL RESULT FROM CURRENT EFFORTS IN KABUL, GENEVA,
NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON UNLESS US TAKES FIRM AND DECISIVE ROLE OF
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LEADERSHIP AND POSITIVE FINANCIAL SUPPORT. CHANCE OF ACHIEVING
AERIAL SURVEY OF BLOOMING SEASON IN BADKHSAN HAS PROBABLY
ALREADY FRITTERED AWAY, UNLESS MARTENS/ SCHURMANN ACT WITH HASTE
SO FAR NOT EXHIBITED IN UN OPERATIONS. (SEE REF B). (FORTUNATELY
WE SHOULD HAVE SOME USEFUL TEST PHOTOGRAPHY FROM HELMAND THANKS
TO FORTUITOUS USAID EFFORT (REF C).

C. WE ARE PREPARING COMPANION PIECE REPORTING OUR CURRENT
ASSESSMENT SHAFIQ GOVERNMENT' S COMMITMENT TO NARCOTICS PROGRAM,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO POTENTIAL ROLE OF PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT
DEPT (WHICH NOW LOOKS MUCH MORE FAVORABLE, ESPECIALLY AS
CONCERNS
OPERATIONS IN ONLY TWO PROVINCES ENVISAGED IN INITIAL STAGES OF
NARCOTICS PROGRAM).

6. ACTION REQUESTED: SUGGEST GENEVA SOUND OUT UN, ESPECIALLY
MARTENS AND SCHURMANN WHEN ALL HAVE RETURNED FROM NEW YORK WITH
ANTICIPATED APPROVED PLAN. ALSO SUGGEST GENEVA KEEP PRESSURE ON
UN PERSONNEL INVOLVED FOR EARLY PREPARATION AND DISTRIBUTION
SHOPPING LIST.
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*** Current Classification *** CONFIDENTIAL

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